We present a model where compensation within a workteam is determined endogenously by the use of a rank-order tournament. Team members compete in their efforts for the right to propose the distribution of a prize within the team. The implementation of a proposal requires the approval of other team members. Failure to reach an agreement is costly and the role of proposer rotates in the order of members' efforts. We show in an experiment that tournaments elicit higher efforts than random determination of the proposer role. Proposers get a significantly larger share of the prize than non-proposers. JEL classification: C72, C91, C92, J33
Introduction
Since the seminal paper by Lazear and Rosen (1981) on rank order tournaments as optimum labor contracts, personnel economics has put a lot of emphasis on the optimal design of tournaments as competitive compensation mechanisms (for overviews see Gibbons, 1998; Lazear, 1999; Prendergast, 1999; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2003) . Traditionally, tournaments provide payments or promotions which serve as prizes given to the winners, i.e. in the context of the labor market to the employees with the highest work effort. Typically, prizes and their distribution among competing employees are exogenously determined, but not subject to bargaining among competing employees.
In this paper, we address a situation in which the prize is endogenously allocated within a team of workers in a bargaining process. We will present a model -and an experimental test of it -in which members of a team have to provide effort which will be rewarded by a fixed prize, conditional on the joint effort meeting a certain threshold. The prize is then distributed among team members in a bargaining process. Members compete in a tournament for the right to propose the distribution of the prize. The member with the highest effort, i.e. the one with the highest contribution to the joint team effort, can make a proposal how to divide the prize. The proposal is implemented if a certain quota (either simple majority or unanimity of team members) is reached. Any time the quota is failed, team members face bargaining costs in the form of a shrinking prize and the right to propose the distribution of the prize rotates in the order of members' efforts.
That means that after the member with the highest effort, it is the turn of the member with the second highest effort, and so on. If all members had their turn, the member with the highest effort can make an ultimate proposal. If this final proposal is rejected, the prize has been used up through the costs of delay and bargaining.
The structure of the model represents a combination of a threshold public good game (see Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984 , for an early theoretical discussion and Croson and Marks, 2000, for a survey of experimental results) with an alternating offer bargaining game (Rubinstein, 1982 ) with a shrinking pie. The combination of both types of games has not been considered in the literature, so far, but seems to reflect quite well the strategic situation introduced at Austrian universities, for instance. The new Austrian law on the organization of universities, which is in effect since 2004, has changed the traditionally centralized system of allocating money to and also within research departments. The new law requires the chancellor of a university to write a contract with a specific research groups (of about 10 to 30 academics) which specifies the targets to be met by the research group concerning its research output in a given period. If the target is failed, research group members with limited contracts have a lower probability of getting renewal and the research group as a whole has a chance next to zero to get additional resources, like a pay rise for its members or more money for research assistants or equipment. If the target is met (or, even better, clearly surpassed), the chancellor can allocate additional resources to the research group. However, the distribution of the additional resources within the group has to be decided within the group itself. A chairperson of the research group -who is elected by the members of the research group -can allocate these resources within the research group, given that he gets sufficient (but legally not specified) support for his proposal within the group.
In our model, we will study the incentives of using a tournament in efforts for the right to propose the allocation of a prize, i.e. in our above example a tournament in research output to become the chairperson within a research group. We will compare our tournament design with the incentives for providing effort in case the right to propose the allocation is determined randomly. We will show in our game-theoretic analysis and with the help of an economic experiment that the tournament design elicits significantly higher efforts. an endowment E and has to choose an effort e i ≤ E. If joint workteam effort ¡P 3 n=1 e n ¢ falls short of a given threshold T (with E < T ≤ 3E), there is no second stage of the game and each member i receives as final payoff
If joint effort passes the threshold, such that X e n ≥ T , the team receives a prize P . By setting P > 3E, we guarantee that it is in any case collectively efficient to reach or surpass the threshold. In the second stage of the game, then, the prize P has to be distributed among the team members in the following way (see Table   1 for a summary of the bargainig process). Let us denote the member with the highest effort in the first stage of the game member H (with effort e h ), the one with the median effort member M (with e m ) and the one with the lowest effort member L(with e l ). In case two (or three) members choose an identical effort level, their role in the second stage of the game is determined by a random draw.
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The first term on the right hand side of equation (2) equals the remaining endowment after subtracting efforts. Exerting effort has constant marginal costs in our case and is equivalent to providing a public good for the members of the team.
Withholding own effort is beneficial for own payoffs, but diminishes the chance of meeting the threshold, which is inefficient for the team as a whole. The second and third term on the right hand side capture the collective and individual gains from meeting the threshold. The second term is derived from the surplus of joint effort above the threshold. This surplus is shared equally among all team members, which resembles an equal bonus for all team members for having passed the threshold. Note, however, that the second term entails no efficiency gains from reaching the threshold, but is a mere (and equal) redistribution of excess effort to team members. 1 The third term represents the individual gain from the prize to be distributed in the team. The actual individual gain depends on the outcome of the bargaing process in the second stage of the game. 1 In principle, it would also have been possible to drop the second term altogether, meaning that excess effort (above the threshold) is wasted, which is often used in experimental public goods games. However, by including the second term we capture the idea that there are at least some gains from providing the threshold public good (i.e. getting the prize) which are shared equally. It is noteworthy that the theoretical analysis of the game and its equilibria do not depend upon the inclusion or exclusion of the second term.
Variations of the model
The basic model introduced in the previous subsection will be referred to as the MAJORITY-model. Note that the model does not strictly catch the characteristics of majority voting, because even if member L supported member H's first proposal, thereby providing a simple majority of supporters, the proposal would not be implemented if member M voted against it. Hence, in this model we always have a powerless minority (i.e. the member not being allowed to vote on the proposal) which can be exploited by a powerful majority of team members. The term MAJORITY is particularly used because it provides a contrast to the first 
Equilibrium strategies
In the following, we present the equilibrium strategies of choosing efforts and allocations of the prize in four propositions, assuming risk neutrality of team members. We relegate the proofs of the propositions to the Appendix, but provide only the basic intuition of the propositions and the comparative statics of the three models here.
Proposition 1:
In the MAJORITY-model, there is a single equilibrium in efforts which satisfies P e j ≥ T . All workteam members choose maximum effort e i = E in the first stage of the game. In the solution of the second stage of the game, the randomly determined member H allocates p h = P/2 to himself and p m = P/2, respectively p l = 0 to the other members. Member M accepts the allocation immediately.
Proof: see Appendix A1.
Proposition 2:
In the UNANIMITY-model, there are two types of equilibria which satisfy P e j ≥ T : Either all team members choose the maximum
E or P ≥ 8(T − E)) or two members choose maximum effort and the third member contributes either zero (if E < T ≤ 2E and P < 8E) or contributes just the amount necessary to reach the threshold (if 2E < T ≤ 3E and P < 8(T −E)). For both types of equilibrium efforts it holds that member H allocates p h = P/2 to himself and P/4 to the other two team members who both accept the allocation.
Proof: see Appendix A2.
Proposition 3:
In the RANDOM-model, there are infinitely many equilibria with P e n = T , but none with P e n > T. The randomly determined member H allocates p h = P/2 to himself and p m = P/2 to the randomly determined member M, but zero to member L. This allocation is accepted by member M.
Proof: see Appendix A3.
Proposition 4:
In all three models, there is a single equilibrium with the property P e n < T. In this equilibrium, all team members choose zero effort e i = 0. The second stage of the game is not reached in this case.
Proof: see Appendix A4.
In Considering those cases where P e n < T, the collectively efficiency-enhancing property of the prize (due to P > 3E) makes it a dominant strategy for member i to choose a positive effort, if and only if his chosen effort alone can raise the joint team effort to or above the threshold. If this is not the case, free riding (e i = 0)
is a dominant strategy and the only equilibrium choice if P e n < T .
Experimental design
In the experimental test of our models, we have set E = 100, T = 196.5, and P = 393. Table 2 summarizes the predictions on efforts and the allocation of the prize which can be derived for these parameters and the three different models.
We exclude the equilibrium of all members choosing zero effort, in which case the threshold, and thus the second stage of the game, is not reached. The three models represent our three treatments, which are denoted in the same way as the models. The experimental instructions -which were framed as neutral as possible and refrained from using words like 'workteam' or 'effort' -can be found in Appendix A5. The choice of parameters is, of course, arbitrary, but was motivated by the following considerations. We have opted for such a set of parameters which yields in UNANIMITY an equilibrium with two team members exerting maximum effort and the third one free riding completely, given that the threshold is reached. By this we ensured different effort predictions between MAJORITY and UNANIM-ITY, in addition to the different predictions on allocation decisions. Since the second type of equilibrium in UNANIMITY is identical to the one in MAJOR-ITY, we thought it to be more interesting to examine experimental behavior under different theoretical equilibria. The threshold T was chosen such that the effort predictions in case of reaching the threshold were are very close to each other in RANDOM ( P e n = 196.5) and UNANIMITY ( P e n = 200). This allowed us to check whether the requirement of unanimity or the random determination of the proposer role has a stronger influence on efforts. Finally, the uneven value of T was chosen such that team members could not coordinate on (identical) integer numbers to reach the threshold exactly. The prize was simply set as double the threshold. From Table 2 we can deduct the following hypotheses about behavior in the experiment.
Hypothesis 1: Average efforts are higher in MAJORITY than in the other two treatments. Average efforts in UNANIMITY and RANDOM do not differ significantly.
Hypothesis 2:
The number of subjects exerting maximum effort is higher in MAJORITY than in UNANIMITY, and higher in UNANIMITY than in RANDOM.
Hypothesis 3:
The shares allocated to group members H, M and L do not differ between MAJORITY and RANDOM, but there are significant differences to the shares for members M and L in UNANIMITY.
The experiment consisted of 6 identical rounds. The repitition was chosen in order to allow for learning in the course of the experiment. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to groups of three subjects which stayed in the same group for the whole experiment. This so-called partner design was known to participants. Each group member was labeled either member 1, member 2 or member 3. Effort choices of single members could be identified by other members through this label. If the threshold was reached, group members were also informed about who could make the proposal for distributing the prize in stage two of a given round and who could make the decision on acceptance or rejection of the proposal. In case of identical effort levels, roles were assigned randomly. When making, respectively accepting or rejecting, proposals, the respective members were informed about each members' effort in stage one and the proposed share of the prize allocated to each member. At the end of stage two, each member got informed about the outcome of the bargaining process in stage two and his payoff from the entire round. Result 2: The number of subjects exerting maximum effort (e i = 100) is significantly higher in MAJORITY (where it is observed in 41% of choices) than in UNANIMITY (29%), and significantly higher in UNANIMITY than in RANDOM (18%) (p < 0.05 in any pair wise comparison; χ 2 -tests). Result 1 shows that our Hypothesis 1 has been borne out only partially. As predicted, efforts are significantly higher in MAJORITY than in RANDOM, with average efforts in the former being about 14% higher than in the latter. This is a clear indication that introducing a rank-order tournament for the right to propose the allocation of the prize induces higher efforts, which comes at the cost of higher variance of efforts, though. The prediction that efforts in UNANIM-ITY would be lower than in MAJORITY and close to those in RANDOM failed.
Efforts in UNANIMITY are significantly larger than in RANDOM and not significantly lower than in MAJORITY. This means that the requirement of unanimity has no significantly negative effect on efforts, compared to MAJORITY. Rather, the tournament design in UNANIMITY induces higher efforts compared to RAN-DOM, without implying significantly higher variance of efforts in UNANIMITY.
There is no significant difference between any of the three treatments concerning the relative frequency of reaching the threshold, ranging from 85% in RANDOM to 90% in UNANIMITY.
Result 2 is a straightforward confirmation of the qualitative prediction of Hypothesis 2. The two treatments with the tournament induce maximum effort most often, whereas random determination of the proposer role leads to the lowest frequency.
According to the predictions of the models we should have expected 100% of subjects exerting maximum effort in MAJORITY, and about 66% of subjects in UNANIMITY. Actual frequencies fall short of this benchmark, particularly in the early rounds. But in the next subsection we will show that the frequency of subjects with e i = 100 shows a strong positive trend across rounds in the treatments with the tournament, but not in RANDOM. fluence of these subject-specific characteristics can not be estimated in the framework of our experiment. The situation is different as far as strategic motives are concerned. Allocating a larger share to the powerless member L could raise the probability of member M accepting the proposal. This, in turn, would make seemingly altruistic behavior pay off for the proposer.
In the bottom row of The significant increase of efforts in the early rounds of MAJORITY and UNA-NIMITY indicates that subjects learn rather quickly that it is advantageous to provide high effort levels in order to have a chance to become proposer. Given that the determination of the proposer role is random in RANDOM, it is no surprise that we find no competition for the role of proposer in this treatment.
The higher average effort levels in MAJORITY and UNANIMITY are mainly due to the change of efforts from round t to round t + 1, contingent on the role in round t. Specifically, subjects who were members L or M in round t increase their effort from round t to round t + 1 significantly more often than members H (p < 0.01; χ 2 -tests), as can be seen in Figures 2 through 4 , where we have pooled data from all six rounds. 5 . On the contrary, in RANDOM there is no difference in reaction patterns of members H, M or L. Rather, the most frequent pattern is to keep effort levels constant, irrespective of member type.
Figures 2 through 4 about here Figure 5 shows the relative frequency of subjects exerting the maximum effort of e i = 100. Whereas this frequency is rather stable -and lowest -in RANDOM, it shows a significantly increasing trend both in MAJORITY and UNANIMITY (p < 0.05 in both treatments; Page test for ordered alternatives). From round 2 on, MAJORITY has the highest relative frequency, which is significantly larger than in UNANIMITY in rounds 3, 5 and 6 (p < 0.05; χ 2 -test) and than in RANDOM from round 3 on (p < 0.01; χ 2 -test). Relative frequencies in UNANIMITY are larger than in RANDOM from round 4 on (p < 0.01; χ 2 -test).
Figure 5 about here 5 Single data for two consecutive rounds each are qualitatively almost identical, such that members L and M in MAJORITY and UNANIMITY increase their efforts, whereas members H keep them basically constant. Given that data for two consecutive rounds each do not provide additional insights, we abstain from reporting these data.
Note that from round 3 on the increase of subjects choosing e i = 100 in MAJOR-ITY and UNANIMITY is not correlated with an increase in the overall average effort levels, as can be seen from Figure 1 above. This is due to a simultaneous and significant increase of the standard deviation of subjects contributions from round 3 on (p < 0.05 in both treatments). Hence, the tournament design does not only lead to higher contributions, compared with random determination of the proposer role in RANDOM, but also to a larger variance of effort levels within the groups which are exposed to the tournament design. . This implies that the first proposal within a group has a significant influence on proposals in consecutive rounds. The more equal are proposals in round 1, the more equal they are in rounds 2 through 6.
Allocation of the prize

Figures 6 through 8 about here
Finally, it seems interesting to look at how offers are related to effort levels. In RANDOM, we find that the average standard deviation of offers is significantly negatively correlated with effort levels (r = −0.45, p < 0.05; with groups as units of observations), meaning that the more unequal the offers are the lower are effort levels. However, in MAJORITY or UNANIMITY, we do not find such a significant correlation (with r = −0.07 and p = 0.7 in MAJORITY, respectively r = −0.06 and p = 0.8 in UNANIMITY). Hence, when the proposer role is 'earned' through effort (in MAJORITY and UNANIMITY), unequal offers do not go hand in hand with lower efforts. Instead unequal offers seem to be acceptable and have no significant negative effects on effort within a group. When the proposer role is determined randomly, however, unequal offers tend to induce lower effort.
Conclusion
We have studied the effects of tournaments on the efforts of workers when the allocation of the tournament's prize is not exogenously fixed (by an employer), but has to be decided endogenously within a workteam (of employees). Our models and the experimental results have shown that the use of tournaments for allocating a prize within a team elicits higher effort levels than if the right to propose an allocation is randomly determined. Our experimental data, however, also clearly suggest that higher efforts with tournaments may come at the cost of higher variance in effort levels and higher variance in the shares of the prize allocated By applying backward induction, we see that in the last move of stage two, i.e.
the fourth proposal (see Table 1 ), member H proposes P/4 for himself and zero to the other two members. Assuming that in case of indifference between acceptance and rejection a member accepts a given proposal, member M accepts the fourth proposal. In the third proposal, member L proposes P/4 to himself and to member H, with the latter accepting. In the second proposal, member M proposes P/2 to himself and P/4 to member L who accepts. As a consequence, the first proposal allocates P/2 both to the proposer, member H (p h = P/2), and the responder, member M (p m = P/2), but nothing to member L (p l = 0). Member M accepts this proposal.
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A1.2 Effort levels (stage one; given P e n ≥ T )
Step 1. First, we show that e * i = e * j = e * k = E is an equilibrium. In step 2 we will, then, show that there is no other equilibrium which satisfies P e n ≥ T . Recall that E < T ≤ 3E and that P > 3E. We let P e −i = e * j +e * k and show that E(π i (e * i )) > E(π i (e i )) for any e i < e * i , where E(·) denotes the expected value of (·). Since in case of identical efforts within a workteam the roles are allocated randomly, we have to calculate expected values when roles are determined randomly. Choosing maximum effort is optimal if
Note that reducing member i's effort from e * i to e i implies that member i will be assigned the role of member L in the second stage of the game, and, thus, will get nothing from the prize. Hence, the right hand side of equation (A1.1) includes no term for the allocation from the prize, whereas the expected share from the prize is captured in the first term on the left hand side. After some rearranging of terms in (A1.1), we can see that the inequality in (A1.1) is satisfied if
The right hand side of (A1.2) is negative due to P > 3E. Since e i is taken from
for any e i < e * i . This holds also for the case where member i's reduction of effort would cause a failure to reach the threshold (such that P e −i + e i < T ), in which case member i earns π i (e i ) = E −e i , which is even smaller than the right hand side of inequality (A1.1).
Hence, no workteam member has an incentive to reduce his effort below E.
Step 2. In step 1 it has been shown that if two members choose maximum effort, it is the best response for the third one to choose maximum effort as well. Hence,
we have to examine all other possible cases, where at most one member chooses maximum effort.
(i) If e i ≤ e j < e k = E (satisfying P e n ≥ T ), it is optimal for member i to increase his effort to e + i = e j + ε, which will yield P/2 from the allocation of the prize instead of the (at best) expected share of P/4 (if e i = e j ) or of zero (if e i < e j ). The gain of P/4 is larger than the arbitrarily small costs of investing ε (if e i = e j ) and the gain of P/2 is larger than the maximally necessary increase for e + i > e j .
(ii) Any combination of efforts with e i ≤ e j ≤ e k < E (satisfying P e n ≥ T ) cannot be an equilibrium in the first stage. To prove this claim, we show that member i (who would be member L in case of such a combination) can raise his expected profit by choosing effort e * i = E, which makes him member H and guarantess P/2 from the allocation of the prize. Let e i = e * i − ε, then E(π i (e * i )) > E(π i (e i )) for any ε, which rules out any combination of efforts with 0 ≤ e i ≤ e j ≤ e k < E (satisfying P e n ≥ T ) as an equilibrium. The upper limit of E(π i (e i ))
is given for the case of e i = e j = e k < E, since in this case member i has a two thirds chance of receiving half of the prize.
Rearranging terms and considering that ε = e * i − e i , inequality (A1.3) is satisfied if P/4 > ε, which is true since P > 3E and ε ≤ E.¥
A2. Proof of proposition 2(UNANIMITY)
A2.1 Allocation of the prize (stage two)
By applying backward induction, we see that in the last move of stage two, the fourth proposal (see Table 1 ), member H proposes P/4 for himself and zero the other two members. We assume that in case of indifference between acceptance and rejection both other members accept the proposal. This yields as the third proposal (made by member L) p l = P/4, p h = P/4 and p m = 0. The second proposal is, then p m = P/4, p l = P/4 and p h = P/4. Finally, the first proposal (by member H) is p h = P/2, p m = P/4 and p l = P/4, which is accepted by members M and L.
A2.2 Effort levels (stage one;
given P e n ≥ T )
For determining the equilibrium effort choices in UNANIMITY, we have to consider the range in which the threshold is set.
A2.2.1 Condition E < T ≤ 2E
Step 1. There are two types of equilibria in this condition, depending upon the size of the prize. Type one (with P < 8E) has two members choosing maximum effort (e * i = e * j = E) and the third member chooses no effort at all (e * k = 0). Type two (with P ≥ 8E) has all members choosing the maximum effort (e * i = e * j = e * k = E).
Starting with the first type, we show that member i (or, likewise, member j) has no incentive to reduce his effort level to e i < e * i = E (= e * j ) (subject to P e n ≥ T ) and, second, that member k has no incentive to raise effort to e k > e * k = 0.
(i) Member i.
Case (1). Let e i = e * i − ε (with ε > 0), and e i + e * j ≥ T .
The first two terms on the left hand side of the inequality capture the expected share from the prize of either being member H or M (which is randomly determined in equilibrium). The third term is the surplus from joint effort. The first term on the right hand side is the share from the prize (as member M), given that member i reduces his effort below E. Collecting terms we arrive at the following inequality to satisfy condition (A2.1).
To meet the threshold (i.e. e i +e * j ≥ T ), ε must meet the following condition (recall that E < T < 2E): ε < 2E − T . In order to meet the property of an equilibrium (i.e. neither member i nor j having an incentive to deviate from e * i = e * j = E), the prize must fulfill the following condition (besides our assumption P > 3E):
7 If condition (A2.3) is violated, there are no equilibria of efforts which satisfy P e n ≥ T . Note that the second type of equilibrium (with all members choosing maximum effort) satisfies condition (A2.3).
Case (2) . Let e i = e * i − ε (with ε > 0), and e i + e * j < T .
Collecting terms, we arrive at the condition 5) which is satisfied due to 3P/8 > 9E/8 > E and (E − T )/3 − e i < E because of T < 2E and e i ≥ 0.
(ii) Member k.
Let e k > e * k = 0. Given e * i = e * j = E, it is straightforward to see that any effort level e k with 0 < e k < E is strictly dominated by e * k . This is so, because the share of the prize is in any of these cases P/4 (see A2.1), but any positive effort level below the maximum level decreases member k's payoff by 2e k /3. Thus, the only reasonable alternative to e * k = 0 is to consider ek = E (which would cause a random determination of the roles for allocating the prize). Therefore, we have to check the following inequality.
This inequality is satisfied and e * k = 0 is member k's optimal effort if
Otherwise, the best reply for member k to e * i = e * j = E would be to choose ek = E himself, which constitutes the second type of equilibrium in UNANIMITY, where the threshold is reached and where also condition (A2.3) is satisfied.
Step 2. Now we show that there are no equilibria other than those presented in step 1 which satisfy P e n ≥ T . Any set of effort levels with E > e i > e j > e k ≥ 0 (and P e n ≥ T ) can not be an equilibrium, because member k has an incentive to deviate to e´k = e i + ε. This guarantees him P/2 instead of P/4 in the allocation of the prize at additional costs smaller than 2E/3. 8 Given that P > 3E, it is in any case profitable for member k to choose e´k instead of e k , because P/4 > 2E/3.
Finally, we have to consider the set of effort levels with E = e i > e j > e k ≥
0.
9 Given e j and e k , it suffices to show that member i's effort e i constitutes no equilibrium choice, because member i could reduce his effort to e´i = e j + ε, since that would still yield him P/2 from the allocation of the prize, but at costs reduced by 2(e i − e´i)/3.
A2.2.2 Condition 2E < T ≤ 3E
Step 1. The set of efforts with e * i = e * j = e * k = E is the first type of equilibrium in this condition. The second type is given by the set of efforts e * i = e * j = E and e * k = T − 2E. First we will show that both sets constitute an equilibrium, in step 2 we will argue that there are no other equilibria which satisfy P e n ≥ T .
Consider the first set with all team members choosing maximum effort. If member i reduces his effort to e i = e * i − ε (with ε > 0), this yields the payoff on the right hand side of inequality (A2.8), whereas the expected payoff from choosing e * i is shown on the left hand side of (A2.8).
(A2.8) 8 Maximal costs are given if e * k = 0 and e ' k = E. Note that the additional expenses of E are partly recovered by the (additional) redistribution of the surplus joint effort (above T ), which is E/3 (given e * k = 0 and e ' k = E). 9 If condition (A2.3) is violated, the set of efforts with E = e i > e j > e k = 0 might be a candidate for an equilibrium. However, this is not possible, as shown in the text.
Rearranging terms and taking into account that P > 3E and that ε = (E − e i ) ≤ 3E − T < E, all members choosing maximum effort is, therefore, an equilibrium if
If P < 8(E − e i ) and T < 2 5 8 E it is an equilibrium if two members choose maximum effort (e * i = e * j = E) and the third one e * k = T − 2E. Any deviation of team members below their equilibrium effort levels would cause the joint team effort to fall below the threshold, which yields a lower payoff than if the threshold is reached. An increase of effort levels is only possible for member k, which makes sense only if condition (A2.9) is satisfied (with P > 8(E − e k )), yielding the first type of equilibrium with e * i = e * j = e * k = E.
Step 2. First we argue that there are no equilibria -other than the one with all subjects choosing maximum effort (if condition A2.9) is satisfied -in which the joint team effort is strictly larger than the threshold. If P e n > T, member k with the lowest effort has an incentive to reduce his effort to e´k = e k − ε such that P e n = T , which would yield him a higher payoff by 2ε/3. Therefore, we can concentrate on all sets of effort which satisfy P e n = T .
(i) If e i = e j = e k < E or if e i < e j = e k < E, member k, for instance, has an incentive to raise his effort by a small amount ε > 0, because that would yield P/2 from the prize instead of an expected P/3 (if e i = e j = e k ) or 3P/8 (if e i < e j = e k ), with the difference between both shares clearly being larger than an arbitrarily small ε.
(ii) If e i < e j < e k < E of if e i < e j < e k = E it holds that e j > E/2 for any combination of e i and e k (given that the threshold T > 2E is reached). Hence, the costs of increasing effort to e j = E are at most E/3 (this is smaller than E/2 due to the fact that one third of the increase in efforts is redistributed in equal parts among all team members), whereas the gains from it are P/4 (if e i < e j < e k < E), respectively P/8 (if e i < e j < e k = E) which are in both cases larger than E/3 due to P > 3E.¥
A3. Proof of proposition 3 (RANDOM)
A3.1 Allocation of the prize (stage two)
The same result as in MAJORITY (see A1.1) applies, since the allocation process is completely identical.
A3.2 Effort levels (stage one; given P e n ≥ T )
Step 1. First we show that the set of effort levels which satisfies P e n = T are an equilibrium. In step 2 we argue that the equilibria of step 1 are the only ones.
Let P e n = T and e * i ∈ [0, E]. Then member i has neither an incentive to (1) increase his effort toē i = e * i + ε nor to (2) reduce his effort to ē i = e * i − ε.
Case (1) . An increase of effort reduces member i's payoffs for any ε > 0, because
Case (2) . A reduction of effort causes joint effort fall to short of the threshold, which results in payoffs of E−ē i for member i, which is smaller than π i (e * i ), because due to P/3 > E and e * i ≤ E the following condition holds.
Step 2. Consider any set of effort levels which satisfies P e n > T . Let us define the surplus joint effort as s = P e n − T . Then, for any member i there is an incentive to reduce his initial effort level e i to ē i = e i − s (if e i ≥ s) or to ē i = 0
(if e i < s), because
A4. Proof of proposition 4
In case no single member can increase his effort such that the threshold is reached (which is the case for all sets of efforts with P e n < T − (E − e min ), where e min denotes the minimum effort in a team), the payoffs π i (e i ) = E − e i are maximized
by setting e i = 0. Exerting no effort at all dominates all other choices, as long as no single member can choose an effort to reach the threshold in the group.
To complete the proof of Proposition 4, we have to show that all sets of effort levels with T − (E − e min ) < P e n < T can not be an equilibrium in any of our models, because at least the member with the minimum effort level, e min , has an incentive to increase his effort to satisfy P e n = T . In the following, we denote the payoff of the member with the (initially) lowest effort level with π min .
It is sufficient to show that there is one effort level e > e min which yields a higher payoff than π min (e min ) = E − e min for the member with the initially lowest effort.
If this member choosesē min = E, the threshold T is passed. The expected gain from reaching the threshold is at the minimum P/3 (which is the case if the other members had chosen e j = e k = E), which is in any case larger than the maximum payoff π min (e min ) = E − e min , in case e min = 0.¥
A5. Experimental instructions for the MAJORITY-treatment (translated from German)
Welcome to the experiment! In this experiment, we are interested in studying economic decision making. All the money you are going to earn in this experiment will be paid to you in private immediately after the experiment.
This experiment has 6 rounds, which have two stages each. There will be groups of 3 subjects each who interact with each other in these 6 rounds. Note that group composition is fixed throughout the whole experiment, that is you interact always with the same two persons. The personal identities of these two other persons, nor your own one, will not be revealed, neither during the experiment nor afterwards.
Stage 1:
In stage 1 of each round, you get an endowment of 100 tokens, which can be spent in two different ways. Either you keep it in your own account or you allocate it to a group account. Any combination of tokens given into your own account or the group account is possible. The tokens put in both accounts only need to sum up to 100.
The private account.
Each token in the private account will be credited 1:1 to your earnings and will be converted into Euro at a fixed exchange rate (see end of instructions for conversion rate). Note that your earnings from the private account will be paid to you whether or not the second stage of a round is reached.
The group account.
Your contributions as well as the contributions of the other two group members are added up. There is a threshold of 196.5 tokens.
1) If this threshold is failed, you are paid your tokens in your private account in this respective round and there is no second stage in this round.
2) If the threshold is met or passed, there will be a second stage in the respective round in which there are 393 tokens (twice the threshold) to be distributed within your group in a way explained below. The difference between the sum of contributions to the group account in your group and the threshold will be redistributed in equal parts to all group members (i.e. each group member receives one third of this surplus).
At the end of stage 1 all group members will be informed about the other members'
allocations to the group and private account and whether the second stage has been reached. Group members will receive a number (either 1, 2 or 3) at the beginning of the experiment which will be kept throughout the experiment. By the member number you will be able to track the decisions of other group members.
Stage 2:
This stage will be played if the threshold has been met or passed in your group account. In this stage, group members have to divide 393 tokens in the following way. If group members agree on a certain division, each member receives the agreed share.
How to reach an agreement?
The group member with the maximum contribution to the group account (in stage 1 of a round) will be called member A in stage 2. The member with the second highest contribution will be denoted member B, and the member with the lowest contribution is named member C. In case of identical contributions of two or three members in stage 1, there will be a random assignment to the respective names.
Member A can make a proposal how to distribute the 393 tokens among all three group members, allocating tokens to member A, B, and C. The exchange rate has been set at 100 token = 1.5 Euro.
